Project Research Dossier - Inco Network (pre-TGE, no public raise)

Project Research Dossier - Inco Network Research date: 2 Oct 2026 | Stage: pre-TGE, no token, no public raise | Author: apap9067 (Squad: shangus)

Disclosure: I hold no position - no token exists. No equity, advisory role, referral arrangement or paid relationship with Inco or any investor named here. I earn Valor Points for this under a rewarded Republic campaign, paid regardless of what I conclude. Research, not investment advice.

Why this subject qualifies: all disclosed capital is private (S1, S2). There is no token, no sale page and no tokenomics anywhere in first-party documentation (S3, S4).

1. What it builds. Inco calls itself "Full-Stack Privacy for Blockchains" and is explicit that it is a confidentiality layer on existing chains, not a new chain (S3). Encrypted EVM types (ebool, eaddress, euint256) plus arithmetic, comparison and access-control let contracts hold encrypted state "without modifying the underlying blockchain" (S5). Public-by-default state is what blocks on-chain payroll, sealed-bid auctions and hidden-information games. The rival approach is a dedicated privacy chain, which fragments liquidity.

2. Verifiable status (first-party, dated)

• 2026-09-02: cToken App + SDK live on Base Mainnet (S3) - first mainnet surface, not a testnet claim
• 2026-08-27: deployed on Celo for private stablecoin payments (S3)
• Base Sepolia testnet; Solana/SVM in beta on Devnet (S3, S4)
• 45 public repos under the Inco-fhevm org, commits through Sep 2026 (S6)
• $5M strategic round led by a16z CSX on 2025-04-24, adding Coinbase Ventures, with follow-on from 1kx, OrangeDAO, South Park Commons and Script Capital; stated total funding $10M (S1, S2)

3. Tokenomics - none published. No token, allocation table, vesting schedule or emissions policy exists in first-party sources as of 2026-10-02 (S3, S4). The architecture overview still reads "Whitepaper coming soon" (S7). Any FDV or circulating figure quoted for Inco today is unsourced,.

4. Unlock and dilution risk - structural model Because real percentages are unpublished, the useful output is a model you can re-run the moment they are. What matters is cliff vs linear: a cliff concentrates supply into one date, linear spreads it. With a 12-month cliff then 24-month linear - the common structure for privately funded infrastructure - the dangerous month is the cliff date, not the drip after.

Illustrative only, NOT Inco figures. If insiders (team + investors) held 50% on a 12m cliff + 24m linear, roughly 2.1% of total supply unlocks on day one of month 12 and about 2.1% per month after. At 60% insiders the same structure puts about 2.5% per month into the market. The dominant sensitivity is the insider share, not the vesting length: a 10-point swing in insider allocation moves monthly sell pressure by about 20%.

Decision rule: treat insider allocation above 55% combined with a single hard cliff as a structural red flag, and read the emissions schedule alongside it, because emissions can double the effective float growth that vesting tables alone imply.

5. Team verification signals

• Verifiable: shipped code is public and continuously updated (45 repos, S6). Mainnet deployment dates are first-party and specific (S3). The investor list is on the project's own site and corroborated by a company-issued release (S2, S3).
• Marketing: "Full-Stack Privacy" and "robust security and reliability" are positioning, not evidence (S3, S5). An investor roster signals diligence by others; it is not an audit.
• Not verifiable today: no audit report published or linked anywhere in the docs index (S4). No named operator for production infrastructure. No whitepaper (S7).

6. Key risks

• Technical: the Confidential Compute Server runs inside a Trusted Execution Environment (S5). A TEE is a hardware trust assumption, not a cryptographic one - a vendor-level enclave break degrades confidentiality for every application at once. With no published audit this is unreviewed by any third party I can cite.
• Centralisation: the docs do not say who operates the Confidential Compute Server, how decryption keys are custodied, or what authorises a decryption beyond an EIP-712 signature path on the client (S5). For a confidentiality product this is the single most important unanswered question.
• Execution: the mainnet surface is about one month old (2026-09-02, S3). Integration breadth (Base, Celo, Solana beta) is being added before the trust model is documented, which raises the cost of a later architectural correction.
• Governance and incentives: no token means no on-chain governance and no published alignment mechanism. Whatever is designed later will be designed after $10M of private capital is already in the cap table.
• Legal and regulatory: confidentiality tooling aimed at stablecoin payments (the Celo positioning, S3) sits closest to transmission and AML scrutiny. Any future token inherits that on top of ordinary securities questions.

Primary sources (all accessed 2026-10-02) S1 inco.org/blog/inco-raises-5m-to-accelerate-development-of-confidentiality-layer-for-blockchains S2 GlobeNewswire company release, 2025-04-24 - Inco Raises $5M in Strategic Round Led by a16z CSX S3 inco.org homepage - self-description, investor list, dated deployment announcements S4 docs.inco.org/llms.txt - full documentation index (basis for the absence claims) S5 docs.inco.org/architecture/components - components, TEE, client library S6 github.com/orgs/Inco-fhevm/repositories - 45 public repos, languages, stars, last-updated S7 docs.inco.org/architecture/overview - modular positioning, "Whitepaper coming soon"

The absence claims (no audit, no tokenomics, no whitepaper) are statements about these sources on that date, not claims that none will ever exist. Happy to be challenged on any of them - particularly if someone has a primary source for the Confidential Compute Server operator or key custody, which is the gap I most want closed.